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The classification of techniques used in mitochondrial donation, namely 
their role as purported gene therapies, is far from clear. These techniques 
exhibit characteristics typical of a variety of classifications that have been 
used in both scientific and bioethics scholarship. We address two 
connected questions this gives rise to: (i) how should we classify 
mitochondrial donation techniques?; and (ii) what ethical implications 
surround such a classification? First, we outline how methods of genetic 
intervention, such as germ-line gene therapy, are typically defined or 
classified. We then consider whether techniques of mitochondrial donation 
fit into these, whether they might do so with some refinement of these 
categories, or whether they require some other approach to classification. 
To answer the second question, we discuss the relationship between 
classification and several key ethical issues arising from mitochondrial 
donation. We conclude that the properties characteristic of mitochondrial 
inheritance mean that most mitochondrial donation techniques belong to a 
new sub-class of genetic modification, which we call ‘conditionally 
inheritable genomic modification’ (CIGM).  
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Is Mitochondrial Donation Germ-Line Gene Therapy? Classifications and 
Ethical Implications. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION – DEFINITIONS, CLASSIFICATIONS AND SIGNIFICANCE 
Discussions of the ethical and scientific aspects of interventions in the 
human genome are grounded in a range of conceptual bases. One of these 
is whether a change made to an individual’s genome will target only them 
or their future children too. To date, human gene therapies tested in 
clinical trials have typically been only intended to induce genetic changes in 
the individual to whom they were given.1 Safety and other concerns have 
meant that genetic interventions that could also affect the genetic makeup 
of a recipient’s future children have not been condoned.2 
                                                          
1 Recent research into embryo genome editing using CRISPR technology is one exception 
to this: P. Liang, et al. CRISPR/Cas9-mediated gene editing in human tripronuclear zygotes. 
Protein Cell 2015; 6: 363-372; and X Kang, et al. Introducing precise genetic modifications 
into human 3PN embryos by CRISPR/Cas-mediated genome editing. J Assist Reprod Genet; 
doi: 10.1007/s10815-016-0710-8, advance online publication 6 April 2016. However these 
studies were not clinical trials, were not intended to lead to embryo transfer or 
subsequent implantation and took place in a jurisdiction that has permissive approaches 
to embryo experimentation. We do not consider these experiments further in this paper 
as they do not currently involve research into mitochondrial donation techniques. 
2 Gene therapy in man. Recommendations of European Medical Research Councils. Lancet 
1988; 1: 1271-1272; UNESCO. 1997. Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and 
Human Rights. Available at: http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=13177&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html [Accessed 4 Jan 2016]: Art 




Mitochondria are small organelles (‘mini organs’) in a cell’s extra-nuclear 
cytoplasm.3 They are essential to cell function and a range of serious 
conditions can result if a person has enough mitochondria with pathogenic 
gene changes (mutations).4 While ‘traditional’ forms of gene therapy have 
tended to target genetic material in the nucleus of a cell, mitochondrial 
donation aims to substitute all of the mitochondria.5 Substituted 
                                                                                                                                                    
the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on 
Human Rights and Biomedicine. Oviedo, Spain: Council of Europe: Art. 13. For a summary 
of relevant national laws, see: T. Ishii. Potential impact of human mitochondrial 
replacement on global policy regarding germline gene modification. Reprod Biomed Online 
2014; 29: 150-155. 
3 For a summary of mitochondrial genetics, see: M.D. Bacchetta & G. Richter. Response to 
"Germ-line therapy to cure mitochondrial disease: protocol and ethics of in vitro ovum 
nuclear transplantation" by Donald S. Rubenstein, David C. Thomasma, Eric A. Schon, and 
Michael J. Zinaman (CQ Vol 4, No 3). Camb Q Healthc Ethics 1996; 5: 450-457; J.J. 
Pasternack. 2005. An Introduction to Human Molecular Genetics: Mechanisms of Inherited 
Diseases, 2nd ed. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Chapter 12; and P.D. Turnpenny. 2012. 
Emery’s Elements of Medical Genetics. 14th ed. St Louis, US: Churchill Livingstone: 181-
183, Chapters 2, 7 & 11. 
4 S. Adhya, et al. Mitochondrial gene therapy: The tortuous path from bench to bedside. 
Mitochondrion 2011; 11: 839-844. For a review of mitochondrial diseases, see: H. 
Cwerman-Thibault, et al. Mitochondrial medicine: to a new era of gene therapy for 
mitochondrial DNA mutations. J Inherit Metab Dis 2011; 34: 327-344; and Y.S. Ng & D.M. 
Turnbull. Mitochondrial disease: genetics and management. J Neurol 2016; 263L 179-91. 
5 We have used the term ‘mitochondrial donation’ in this paper as this matches the scope 
of the special issue, as well as being the predominant term used in the United Kingdom. 
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mitochondria may also be inherited by the individual’s children, albeit in a 
non-standard way (which we discuss below). Mitochondrial donation 
therefore challenges existing presumptions around inheritable 
modifications to the genome and gives rise to a question over how these 
approaches should be classified. 
 
There are three reasons why the significance of this classification is 
interesting from a bioethical perspective:  
(i) The unique attributes of mitochondria offer an interesting 
opportunity for conceptual ‘boundary work’, particularly 
regarding how we understand related classifications such as 
germ-line gene therapies (GLT), or even what constitutes 
‘therapy’;6 
(ii) The way mitochondrial donation is classified may have 
implications for the acceptability of this technology if, for 
                                                                                                                                                    
However, we note that other terms such as ‘mitochondrial replacement’, ‘mitochondrial 
transfer’, ‘mitochondrial therapy’ (or combinations thereof) are also used. Below, we coin 
our own term (‘mitochondrial targeting techniques’; or MTTs), which we believe better 
suits the interventions and does not give rise to problems such as the fact that it is not 
merely mitochondria that are ‘donated’, but everything barring the pronuclei or spindle: T. 
Lewens. 2015. The Biological Foundation of Bioethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 
Chapter 1.  
6 Adams asserts the value to bioethics of having conceptual guidelines for genetic 




example, there are ethical concerns associated with a particular 
classificatory category; and 
(iii) The classification may have implications for how policy should 
be made for mitochondrial donation, particularly with regard to 
the acceptability of allowing interventions that target 
mitochondria in germ cells and embryos.7 
 
There are also a number of ways we might approach such a classification:8 
(a) adopting narrow ‘traditional’ classifications and seeing how 
mitochondrial donation fits;  
(b) assessing broad categories that take in a wider range of activities; 
or  
(c) considering the ‘core moral concern’ arising in mitochondrial 
donation, by looking for similarities in the ethical issues that are 
associated with various categories of genome intervention and 
grouping them accordingly.  
 
                                                          
7 While this is an interesting and important question, its full consideration is beyond the 
scope of this paper. For further discussion, see, e.g.: E. Juengst & E. Parens. 2003. Germ-
line dancing: definitional considerations for policy makers. In Designing our Descendants: 
The Promises and Perils of Genetic Modifications. A.R. Chapman & M.S. Frankel, eds. 
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press: 20-36; and A.L. Bonnicksen. Transplanting 
nuclei between human eggs: Implications for germ-line genetics. Polit Life Sci 1998; 17: 3-
10. 
8 Adapted from Juengst & Parens, Ibid, p. 23. 
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As we shall argue, none of these approaches provide us with a clear route 
to classification, as they each leave significant problems unaccounted for 
with respect to mitochondrial donation. Approach (a) will be too narrow, as 
characteristics of both mitochondria and mitochondrial donation mean 
that at least some forms of this intervention constitute neither somatic nor 
germ-line gene therapy as traditionally defined. Approach (b) proves too 
much, encompassing other non-genetic interventions; and Approach (c) 
highlights ways in which mitochondrial donation does not sit comfortably 
within existing classificatory categories due to concerns over its 
therapeutic status and risks. This leads us to claim the need for another 
approach, a new sub-class within genome modification that sits between 
(a) and (b), but which also accommodates concerns raised by (c). We term 
this sub-class ‘conditionally inheritable genomic modification’ (CIGM). 
 
In developing our argument, we first describe the interventions under 
discussion. Second, we look at definitions of key classificatory concepts, 
such as the germline. We then consider how well mitochondrial donation 
actually fits these definitions (or modified versions thereof). Finally, we 
discuss the links between classification for mitochondrial donation and 
how we view the ethical status of mitochondrial donation, before 





II. INTERVENTIONS TO PREVENT OR TREAT MITOCHONDRIAL DISEASE 
Mitochondria are vital to cell function and have roles in energy generation 
as well as cell growth, differentiation and repair.9 They have their own 
genome and are often present in thousands of copies in a cell.10 Yet 
despite their essential role, mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) is much more 
vulnerable to developing mutations than nuclear DNA.11 Once a certain 
threshold in mutation load is reached, cellular function is affected, leading 
to disease.12 Mitochondria are inherited in a matrilineal fashion: passed 
only from mothers to their children.13 
 
                                                          
9 Bachetta & Richter, op. cit. note 3; Pasternack, op. cit. note 3; Turnpenny, op. cit. note 3.  
10 A genome can be defined as the total genetic complement in a particular individual. It is 
also worth noting that mitochondria exist in a symbiotic relationship with nuclear DNA, in 
that several genes in a cell’s nucleus are also involved in mitochondrial function: 
Turnpenny, op. cit. note 3, p. 126. 
11 This can lead to ‘heteroplasmy’, where cells contain a mix of mutated and non-mutated 
mitochondria. Cells that have mitochondria all of the one type are ‘homoplasmic’. Women 
at risk of passing mitochondrial conditions to their children will have oocytes that are 
either homoplasmic or heteroplasmic. If the latter, then options such as prenatal diagnosis 
or pre-implantation genetic diagnosis may be available to them. A woman’s mutation 
status could also have classificatory significance, which we discuss further below. 
12 Adhya, et al., op. cit. note 4, Cwerman-Thibault, op. cit. note 4; and Ng & Turnbull, op. 
cit. note 4.  




Given the impact of mitochondrial disease, a strong desire by couples to 
have genetically related children, and the difficulty in screening or selecting 
for mitochondrial disease prior to birth or embryo transfer, various 
methods of ameliorating mitochondrial disease in oocytes (eggs) and 
embryos are being investigated. The most prominent of these methods are 
Maternal Spindle Transfer (MST) and Pronuclear Transfer (PNT). 14 
 
Maternal Spindle Transfer (MST) 
MST involves transferring the spindle (the nucleus in a particular stage of 
cell division) from an oocyte (egg cell) of a woman who will likely pass on a 
mitochondrial condition to her children into a donor oocyte provided by a 
healthy donor, which has had its nucleus removed (an enucleated oocyte). 
This oocyte is then fertilised using sperm from the woman’s partner and, 
assuming other standard aspects of in-vitro fertilisation are satisfied (such 
as embryo quality on visual inspection), the egg will be implanted at an 
appropriate time in the hope that fertilisation will occur. In short, this 
technique leads to the creation of an oocyte with ‘healthy’ mitochondria 
                                                          
14 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority. Undated. New techniques to prevent 
mitochondrial disease. London: HFEA. Available at: 
http://mitochondria.hfea.gov.uk/mitochondria/what-is-mitochondrial-disease/new-
techniques-to-prevent-mitochondrial-disease/ [Accessed 4 Jan 2016]. An early protocol for 
MST was published with the alternate acronym of IVONT (in vitro ovum nuclear 
transplantation) in 1995: D.S. Rubenstein, et al. Germ-line therapy to cure mitochondrial 
disease: protocol and ethics of in vitro ovum nuclear transplantation. Camb Q Healthc 
Ethics 1995; 4: 316-339. 
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containing a nucleus obtained from an oocyte that has ‘unhealthy’ 
mitochondria. One of the most important features of MST from both 
classificatory and ethical perspectives is that the manipulation of 
mitochondria and gametes occurs prior to fertilization. 
 
Pronuclear Transfer (PNT) 
PNT adopts a similar ‘replacement’ approach to MST, but occurs at an early 
embryonic stage as opposed to in oocytes that are then fertilised. It 
involves fertilising an oocyte from an ‘affected’ woman with her partner’s 
sperm to create a zygote (early embryo). The pronuclei (the nuclei of the 
sperm and egg during fertilisation, prior to them fusing) is then removed 
and placed into another zygote that has been created using a donor oocyte 
and the partner’s sperm, but which has had the pronuclei removed. This 
embryo then begins to develop and is placed into the woman as for MST 
above. A crucial difference between PNT and MST is that in PNT the 




Other interventions to prevent mitochondrial disease 
While MST and PNT are currently the primary modalities for mitochondrial 
therapy, they are not the only possibilities. Other approaches are more 
akin to ‘traditional’ gene therapy, targeting individual genes rather than 
organelles.15 Advances in genome editing, for example, have raised the 
possibility that genes within the nucleus or mitochondria could be altered 
in either existing or future individuals.16 
 
These other interventions could not be considered as mitochondrial 
donation, as no ‘donation’ takes place. However, given rapid advances in 
genome editing they may become more important over time. Accordingly, 
they will likely influence how we wish to classify interventions to prevent 
mitochondrial disease. For this reason, from hereon we refer to 
‘mitochondrial targeting techniques’ (MTTs) rather than ‘mitochondrial 
donation’. MTTs will group together any biomedical intervention that aims 
to alter the composition, structure or expression of mtDNA within a cell, 
whether via MST, PNT, genome editing or another method. 
                                                          
15 Adhya, et al., op. cit. note 4. 
16 T. Morrow. 2015. Is gene editing mtDNA an alternative to mitochondrial replacement 
therapy? Sussex, UK: Ted's Blog. Available at: 
https://tedmorrow.wordpress.com/2015/04/24/is-gene-editing-mtdna-an-alternative-to-
mitochondrial-replacement-therapy/ [Accessed 19 August 2015]; T. Ishii. Germline 
genome-editing research and its socioethical implications. Trends Mol Med 2015; 21: 473-
481; and P. Reddy, et al. Selective elimination of mitochondrial mutations in the germline 




III. MTTs AS GENE THERAPIES? 
The first stage in determining how we should classify MTTs requires an 
account of the distinguishing features of the relevant potential categories 
of classification. Once a consensus definition has been determined, these 
can be applied to MTTs to address the approaches posed in Part I. 
 
One classificatory distinction of significant historical interest is between 
somatic and germ-line gene therapies.17 Exploring this distinction not only 
raises the question as to whether MTTs might fall under the definition of 
somatic or germ-line therapy, but also whether they should be considered 
as gene therapies at all. This requires an initial definition of gene therapy. 
 
Gene therapy can be defined as ‘the correction of specific genetic defects 
in individual patients.’18 It is often defined with reference to the use of 
                                                          
17 R.F. Chadwick. 2009. Gene therapy. In A Companion to Bioethics, 2nd ed. H. Kuhse & P. 
Singer, eds. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing: 207-215. 
18 European Medical Research Councils, op. cit. note 2. The Human Genome Organisation 
(HUGO) offers a similar but more detailed definition of gene therapy as the ‘correction or 
prevention of disease through the addition and expression of genetic material that 
reconstitutes or corrects missing or aberrant genetic functions or interferes with disease-
causing processes’: HUGO Ethics Committee. 2001. Statement on Gene Therapy Research. 
London: Human Genome Organization, cited by Chadwick, Ibid. 
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genes to ‘treat or prevent disease’,19 to ‘replace a faulty disease-causing 
gene’,20 or using a ‘functioning gene to correct the effects of a disease-
causing mutation.’21 One challenge in classifying MTTs is that, if the term 
‘gene therapy’ is actually intended to imply changes to genes,22 some MTTs 
might be said to fall outside this definition, given that whole extra-nuclear 
organelles are substituted instead of targeting individual genes for 
alteration.23 
 
                                                          
19 Genetics Home Reference. 2015. What is gene therapy? Washington, DC: US National 
Institutes of Health. Available at: http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/handbook/therapy/genetherapy 
[Accessed 5 Jan 2016]. 
20 Better Health Channel. 2011. Gene therapy. Melbourne: Victoria State Government. 
Available at: https://www.betterhealth.vic.gov.au/health/conditionsandtreatments/gene-
therapy [Accessed 5 Jan 2016]. 
21 Your Genome. 2015. What is gene therapy? Cambridge: Wellcome Genome Campus.  
[Accessed 5 Jan 2016]. 
22 D.R. Thorburn, et al. The pros and cons of mitochondrial manipulation in the human 
germ line. Mitochondrion 2001; 1: 123-127. 
23 The direction of ‘therapy’ to an identifiable individual may also be problematic; a point 
we consider further in Part IV below. It is also interesting to note that even some 
definitions of ‘mitochondrial gene therapy’ would appear to exclude MST and PNT; 
focusing instead on approaches that alter DNA or modify its expression within 
mitochondria: e.g. Adhya, et al., op. cit. note 4. 
14 
 
As to whether MTTs are gene therapies, there is some support for the view 
that mtDNA is not a significant component of the genome.24 On this view, 
mtDNA is ‘unlikely to change the physical and personality traits that define 
[a person],’25 and will merely govern energy production.26 However, as 
knowledge of the mitochondrial genome increases, the recognised 
contribution of mtDNA to human traits is also growing. Mutations in 
mitochondrial DNA have been linked to problems with bodily systems such 
as the brain, kidneys, the heart, endocrine system and skeletal muscles. 
They have also been linked to specific diseases such as Parkinson’s Disease, 
macular degeneration and response to traumatic brain injury.27 
                                                          
24 e.g. Public Health Directorate / Health Science and Bioethics Division. 2014. 
Mitochondrial Donation: A consultation on draft regulations to permit the use of new 
treatment techniques to prevent the transmission of a serious mitochondrial disease from 
mother to child. London: Department of Health. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/285251
/mitochondrial_donation_consultation_document_24_02_14_Accessible_V0.4.pdf 
[Accessed 26 Aug 2015]: 13. The implication here being that if a change is not significant, it 
does not constitute gene therapy (of any kind).  
25 C.T. Moraes, et al. Manipulating mitochondrial genomes in the clinic: playing by 
different rules. Trends Cell Biol 2014; 24: 209-211: 211. 
26 Nuffield Council on Bioethics. 2012. Novel techniques for the prevention of 
mitochondrial DNA disorders: an ethical review. London: Nuffield Council on Bioethics. 
Available at: http://nuffieldbioethics.org/project/mitochondrial-dna-disorders/ [Accessed 
4 Jan 2016]. 
27 Thorburn et al., op. cit. note 22; H. Li, et al. Physiology and pathophysiology of 
mitochondrial DNA. Adv Exp Med Biol 2012; 942: 39-51; G. Hudson, et al. Two-stage 
15 
 
Additionally, the nature and effects of mitochondrial disease are significant 
and indeed are the whole reason MTTs are under development. To this 
end, given the significance of mtDNA, MTTs would seem to fall within the 
scope of the definitions of gene therapy provided above.  
 
Moreover, given this significance of mtDNA in determining our physical 
constitution, it is reasonable to intend MTTs to be a form of gene therapy 
and so what may be needed is for definitions of gene therapy, or their 
variations, to reflect the fact that the target for change is not only a gene. 
Like ‘traditional’ gene therapy, MTTs are being developed to correct a 
genetic condition and researchers in this area are describing them as ‘gene 
therapy’.28 That said, some scholars have also pointed out the limits of the 
                                                                                                                                                    
association study and meta-analysis of mitochondrial DNA variants in Parkinson’s disease. 
Neurology 2013; 80: 2042-8; H. Bulstrode, et al. Mitochondrial DNA and traumatic brain 
injury. Ann Neurol 2014; 75: 186-95; M.C. Kennedy, et al. Mitochondrial DNA variants 
mediate energy production and expression levels for CFH, C3 and EFEMP1 genes: 
implications for age-related macular degeneration. PLoS One, 2013; 8: e54339; A.L. 
Bredenoord, et al. Ooplasmic and nuclear transfer to prevent mitochondrial DNA 
disorders: conceptual and normative issues. Hum Reprod Update 2008; 14: 669-678. 
28 e.g. M. Tachibana, et al. Towards germline gene therapy of inherited mitochondrial 
diseases. Nature 2013; 493: 627-631; and S. Di Mauro, et al. Approaches to the treatment 
of mitochondrial diseases. Muscle Nerve 2006; 34: 265-283. 
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term ‘gene therapy’.29 With this in mind, the next step is to consider what 
kind of modification MTTs might be. 
 
Somatic gene therapy 
The term ‘somatic’ as we now use it comes from the German word 
‘somatische’, as coined by embryologist August Weismann in 1885.30 He 
distinguished somatische cells from those that contained keimplasma 
(germ plasm) which, at the time, was considered responsible for passing on 
traits. While we now know that genes (and the moderation of their 
expression) explain how many traits are transmitted between generations, 
Weismann’s distinction between cell types has persisted. 
 
Somatic gene therapy occurs where ‘foreign genes are inserted into a 
target cell line (for cells other than germ cells) to correct a genetic 
defect.’31 There is thus no intention that the introduced material will be 
passed on to the recipient’s descendants, although an off-target 
                                                          
29 D.B. Resnik & P.J. Langer. Human germline gene therapy reconsidered. Hum Gene Ther 
2001; 12: 1449-1458. We discuss this further below. 
30 A. Weismann. 1891. Essays upon Heredity and Kindred Biological Problems. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press., cited by Juengst & Parens, op. cit. note 7, p. 21. It should be 
noted that the root of this term is the Greek 'soma' meaning 'the body', as distinct from 
‘the soul/the mind,’ although in this application it was taken to mean ‘the body of an 
organism’ as distinct from its ‘reproductive cells.’ 
31 I. Kerridge, et al. 2013. Ethics and Law for the Health Professions, 4th ed. Sydney: The 
Federation Press: 1089. 
17 
 
therapeutic insertion may inadvertently augment an individual’s germ-line 
too. 
 
Germ-line gene therapy (GLT) 
The germ-line is genetic material that is inheritable by children from their 
parents.32 GLT has therefore been described as ‘the insertion of a normal 
gene into the germ-line ... to replace a defective or lethal gene...’33 
 
There are a number of targets for these inheritable changes. Early 
definitions of GLT pertained directly to genetic alterations of gametes or 
germ cells.34 Later descriptions expanded the array of target cells from just 
                                                          
32 M.S. Frankel & B.T. Hagen. 2011. Germline therapies. London: Nuffield Council on 
Bioethics. Available at: http://nuffieldbioethics.org/wp-
content/uploads/Germline_therapies_background_paper.pdf [Accessed 15 June 2015]: 1. 
33 Kerridge et al., op. cit. note 31: 1090. Frankel & Chapman offer a similar definition, that 
mentions ‘transfer of genetic material’ rather than inserting genes: M.S. Frankel & A.R. 
Chapman. 2000. Human Inheritable Genetic Modifications: Assessing Scientific, Ethical, 
Religious and Policy Issues. United States: American Association for the Advancement of 
Science. Available at: 
http://www.aaas.org/sites/default/files/migrate/uploads/germline.pdf [Accessed 18 Aug 
2015]: 61. 
34 e.g. Anderson described it as ‘the correction of the disorder in the gametic cells of the 
patient so that children of the patient would receive the normal gene’: W.F. Anderson. 
Human gene therapy: why draw a line? J Med Philos 1989; 14: 681-693: 682; while 
Walters and Palmer used the slightly simpler description of ‘a therapeutic genetic 
18 
 
gametes to also encompass pre-embryos, early embryos, or changes made 
within an adult that also affected gametes.35 
 
The key distinction between somatic and germ-line gene therapy is that 
germ-line interventions will effect changes in the descendants of those who 
have received the change. The therapeutic target is a child of the ‘affected’ 
individual, not necessarily the individual whose gametes are being used. 
Some commentators emphasise the permanence of the genetic change 
through generations36; an attribute of GLT that is of particular relevance to 
MTTs. 
 
Alternative classifications: IGM and HGLGM 
Limits of the above classifications, such as their focus on altering discrete 
genes, have already been described. To this end, alternative classifications 
have emerged.  
 
                                                                                                                                                    
alteration in germ-line cells.’: L. Walters & J.G. Palmer. 1997. The Ethics of Human Gene 
Therapy. New York: Oxford University Press: 62. 
35 e.g. Council of Europe, op. cit. note 2; Juengst & Parens, op. cit. note 7; Bredenoord, et 
al., op. cit. note 27; and J.C. Fletcher & W.F. Anderson. Germ-line gene therapy: a new 
stage of debate. Law Med Health Care 1992; 20: 26-39. 
36 e.g. E.M. Berger & B.M. Gert. Genetic disorders and the ethical status of germ-line gene 
therapy. J Med Philos 1991; 16: 667-683.  
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Some alternative classifications define an intervention by its cellular target 
(somatic or germ cell37; or the particular part of the cell38 - as opposed to 
targeting a gene) and its actual effect.39 However, cellular targets can be 
hard to control. And waiting to observe an effect prior to categorising an 
intervention such as MTTs will be problematic for both ethical and policy 
analysis, as if categorisation is relevant to these activities then post-hoc 
classification will not be helpful. Hence, in what follows we take a 
prospective approach to classification of MTTs. 
 
A more promising conceptualisation is Inheritable Genetic Modification 
(IGM). One definition of IGM is: 
…any biomedical intervention that can be expected to enable us to 
modify the genome [such] that the subject of the intervention can 
transmit [it] to her or his offspring selectively.40 
                                                          
37 M. Lappé. Ethical issues in manipulating the human germ line. J Med Philos 1991; 16: 
621-639. 
38 Bacchetta & Richter, op. cit. note 3. 
39 e.g. Lappé, op. cit. note 37. 
40 Juengst & Parens, op. cit. note 7, p. 33; emphasis added. This definition is similar to 
those offered by Rasko et al: J.E.J. Rasko, et al. 2006. Is inheritable genetic modification 
the new dividing line? In The Ethics of Inheritable Genetic Modification: A Dividing Line? 
J.E.J. Rasko, et al., eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1-15; and Frankel & 
Chapman, op. cit. note 33: 2. The use of ‘biomedical intervention’ is an important 
limitation in that it rules out other kinds of intervention, such as partner choice, that could 




IGM, it is claimed, ‘more clearly captures the variety of ways in which 
genetic information can be passed to the next generation.’41 That is, IGM 
allows recognition that emergent interventions such as MTTs can fall 
outside traditional definitions of and distinctions between somatic and 
germ-line gene therapy. 
 
The other advantage is IGM’s focus on inheritable modifications, rather 
than germ-line therapies. This focuses on the effects of the intervention 
rather than its biological properties.42 As we discuss in section IV, there 
may also be forms of MTT which, due to the Non-Identity Problem, are not 
therapeutic in that they will not benefit a particular individual. Further, like 
other genetic interventions, MTTs could one day be used to enhance rather 
than to treat.43 
 
The above definition of IGM is, however, a broad classificatory category 
and as such may be overly inclusive. It may, for example, encompass 
incidental changes to the epigenome44 caused by, for example, some 
biomedical interventions such as prescription drugs. This will conflate 
                                                          
41 Frankel & Hagen, op. cit. note 32, p. 5. 
42 Rasko, et al., op. cit. note 40. 
43 Ibid. We discuss these latter two considerations in more detail in Part IV below. 
44 The epigenome comprises non-genetic but nevertheless inheritable chemical modifiers 
of gene function. 
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interventions using techniques of molecular biology with other 
biomedically-mediated changes. This is undesirable for both conceptual 
and pragmatic reasons; such as maintaining separate regulatory processes, 
but will be mitigated by narrower definitions of IGM.45 
 
Resnik and Langer offer a conceptual refinement that is also useful.46 In 
describing what they term ‘human germline genome modification’ 
(HGLGM; emphasis added), they recognise that altering a genome can be 
done at more than the level of the gene. This is implied in the above 
definition of IGM but is not reflected in the name (‘inheritable genetic 
modification’). Resnik and Langer also recognise that the distinctions 
between therapy, prevention and enhancement are not absolute. HGLGM 
can be said to have occurred when ‘a genome [is created] that would not 
have occurred otherwise’ and that such creation is intentional.47 However 
HGLGM is also narrower than IGM in that it focuses on the target of 
intervention (the germ-line), whereas IGM is framed according to the 
intended effect: whether the change is inheritable. 
                                                          
45 e.g. Bredenoord, et al., op. cit. note 27. At p. 670 they describe IGM as: ‘new genetic 
material... [being] introduced into the gametes (or early embryo).’ They add that ‘This 
genetic modification is not only passed on to the child, but also to subsequent 
generations.’ We claim that a definition of IGM is undesirable if any human or 
environmental intervention could end up being classified as IGM. 
46 Resnik & Langer, op. cit. note 29. 
47 Ibid, p. 1453. They expressly include techniques such as (what are now known as) PNT 




As we discuss further below, a modified concept incorporating elements of 
both IGM and HGLGM, which also accounts for the distinguishing features 
of mtDNA inheritance, may be the best classificatory tool for MTTs. 
 
The variables of classification 
We have considered a range of definitions and classifications of 
interventions into the human genome. Yet these classifications have not 
yet allowed us to consider the properties of MTTs in depth. Here, we 
present six variables in approaches to genetic intervention which will help 
inform how MTTs may be classified. 
 
First is the target of the intervention.48 In more traditional approaches, the 
target for genetic modification has been genetic material, usually a single 
gene, in the nucleus. In MST and PNT, the target for augmentation is a 
whole organelle outside of the nucleus. The implications of this could, for 
example, lead to these particular MTTs being viewed instead as ‘organelle 
transplants’ and thus falling outside the scope of gene therapy 
altogether.49 
                                                          
48 Rubenstein, et al., op. cit. note 14; Bonnicksen, op. cit. note 7; Juengst & Parens, op. cit. 
note 7. 
49 e.g. NESCI. 2008. Briefing paper on the need to protect the future possibility of treating 
mitochondrial disease and other conditions by a procedure that involves mitochondrial 




Some have used the interventional target to distinguish MTTs. For 
example, the United Kingdom (UK) Department of Health has defined 
genetic modification as something that ‘involves the germ-line 
modification of nuclear DNA (in the chromosomes).’50 Yet while this makes 
for a clear distinction and may serve useful policy purposes, some may also 
claim that this overlooks the relationship between nuclear DNA and 
mtDNA, including how mitochondrial haplotypes may influence nuclear 
                                                                                                                                                    
http://www.ncl.ac.uk/nesci/assets/docs/NESCIbriefon2008HFEbill-
MitochondrialTransplants-Vers01-6.pdf [Accessed 3 Jul 2015]; Bredenoord, et al., op. cit. 
note 27; Moraes, et al., op. cit. note 25; Frankel & Hagen, op. cit. note 32. The United 
Kingdom Department of Health have also endorsed an analogy between mitochondria and 
a ‘battery pack’: Public Health Directorate / Health Science and Bioethics Division, op. cit. 
note 24, p. 13; c.f. Juengst & Parens, op. cit. note 7. Opposing this idea, Juengst and 
Parens claim (and we agree) that ‘a human germ-line cell [that has undergone therapy] 
has had part of its genome … replaced in a way that will be inherited by its descendants’: 
at p. 30 – thus aligning more with the concept of gene therapy/genetic modification than 
transplantation. Additionally, in most cases of organ donation it is only a very rare 
occurrence to pass genetic changes to future generations.  
50 Public Health Directorate / Health Science and Bioethics Division. 2014. Mitochondrial 
Donation: Government response to the consultation on draft regulations to permit the use 
of new treatment techniques to prevent the transmission of a serious mitochondrial 
disease from mother to child. London: Department of Health. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/332881
/Consultation_response.pdf [Accessed 25 Aug 2015]: 15. Emphasis added. The UK 




DNA expression.51 It is also inconsistent with views on what constitutes 
genetic modification (synthesised above) and other policy statements that 
categorise MTTs as genetic modifications while simultaneously classifying 
some MTTs as IGMs.52 
 
Second, the method of gene modification can also differ. In ‘standard’ 
approaches to gene therapy, recombinant DNA technology tends to be 
used. This uses restriction enzymes - chemicals that cleave DNA by 
                                                          
51 E.H. Morrow, et al. Risks inherent to mitochondrial replacement. EMBO Rep 2015; 16: 
541-544; K Reinhardt, et al. Mitochondrial replacement, evolution, and the clinic. Science 
2013; 341: 1345-1346; D.B. Sloan, et al. Mitonuclear linkage disequilibrium in human 
populations. Proc. R. Soc. B, 282: 20151704; Bredenoord, et al., op. cit. note 27. Note, 
however, that this debate is not settled. While evolutionary biologists continue to raise 
concerns about how MTTs may disrupt the regulation of nuclear gene expression by 
mtDNA, MTT researchers involved point to the main experiments leading to this concern 
having been undertaken in fruit flies (which have poor evolutionary conservation with 
humans) and inbred mice (which again may be a poor model): personal communication - 
Prof David Thorburn, 18 & 22 September 2016. Some propose using haplotype-matched 
mitochondrial DNA in MTTs: N. Gemmell and J.N. Wolff. Mitochondrial replacement 
therapy: Cautiously replace the master manipulator. BioEssays 2015 37: 584–585; and K.J 
Dunham-Snary and S.W Ballinger. Mitochondrial-nuclear DNA mismatch matters. Science 
2015; 349: 1449-1450. 
52 See, for example: National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2016. 
Mitochondrial Replacement Techniques: Ethical, Social, and Policy Considerations. 
Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. Available at http://www.nap.edu/21871 
[Accessed 4 Feb 2016], Chapter 3, p.7ff. We discuss this approach further below. 
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recognising certain DNA sequences. However, MST and PNT do not involve 
any alteration at the level of DNA (although other forms of MTTs may). The 
UK Department of Health highlighted this distinction, pointing out that: 
The key consideration is that these techniques only substitute, 
rather than alter, a very limited number of unhealthy genes … of 
cells with healthy ones.53 
 
Another method-oriented distinction relevant to methods of MTT that 
involve genome editing is that the therapeutic vector (the system that 
delivers the intervention) would only need to be expressed for a short 
time.54 This would destroy the mutated mitochondria in a target cell 
(whether somatic or germ-line), and the ‘healthy’ mitochondria would 
proliferate.55 Changes to nuclear DNA, in contrast, would need to be 
continuously active for the altered gene expression to persist.    
 
A third demarcation in gene therapy definitions is the mechanism of 
inheritance of the introduced change. In classic approaches to gene 
therapy, the changes to the genome would follow Mendelian inheritance.56 
                                                          
53 Public Health Directorate / Health Science and Bioethics Division, op. cit. note 24: 13. 
54 Moraes et al., op. cit. note 25. 
55 Note that this would only work if the target cell contained a mix of healthy and mutated 
mitochondria (heteroplasmy). 
56 That is, the changes would follow rules of genetic segregation first described by Gregor 
Mendel. See: Pasternack, op. cit. note 3, Chapter 3. 
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However, changes in mitochondria following MTTs would only persist 
through subsequent generations if a female child went on to have female 
children.57 Further, the cell division process during oocyte creation and 
embryogenesis is considered to lead to a ‘bottleneck’ effect that influences 
which mitochondria are passed from a mother to her children.58 This, 
combined with their comparably high rate of mutation and the uncertain 
way in which mitochondria are distributed during cell division,59 means 
that interventions in a cell’s mitochondria will impact future generations 
differently (and often with less certainty) than changes to nuclear DNA. We 
call these properties their ‘conditional inheritance’. There is no other mode 
of genetic inheritance that has the same conditional effects as that seen in 
mitochondria.60 
                                                          
57 This also raises an interesting point about inheritability and subsequent likely impact on 
future generations that we return to when considering the ethical implications of MTT. 
58 J. Poulton, et al. Transmission of mitochondrial DNA diseases and ways to prevent them. 
PLoS Genet 2010; 6; H.S. Lee, et al. Rapid mitochondrial DNA segregation in primate 
preimplantation embryos precedes somatic and germline bottleneck. Cell Rep 2012; 1: 
506-515; and I.J. Wilson, et al. Mitochondrial DNA sequence characteristics modulate the 
size of the genetic bottleneck. Hum Mol Gen 2016; 25: 1031-41. 
59 H.J.M. Smeets. Preventing the transmission of mitochondrial DNA disorders: selecting 
the good guys or kicking out the bad guys. Reprod Biomed Online 2013; 27: 599-610. 
60 Inheritability of mitochondrial mutations depends on the biological sex of the parent, 
bottleneck effects, rates of mutagenesis and chance (and taking it as given that 
reproduction is definitely going to take place). Regarding matrilineal inheritance, one of 
the interesting aspects of how we might wish to regulate or generate policy for MTTs is 




Fourth, the kind and degree of change could be relevant. The 
substitution/alteration distinction already mentioned could be said to be a 
difference in kind. Additionally, we might point to the size of the 
mitochondrial genome, which comprises only 37 genes with a total length 
of 16.5kb. MTTs may therefore consist of a smaller overall change when 
compared to interventions targeted to the nucleus, particularly if a large 
gene were altered. However, we also recognise that relying on degree of 
change alone may be problematic. Even though the size of the genome is 
small, oocytes can contain around 200,000 copies of the mitochondrial 
genome – only 0.2% of the number of genes, but 50% of the amount of 
DNA.61 Further, as Smeets points out, there are scientific scenarios for MTT 
in which a recipient oocyte or embryo ends up having no new mtDNA 
sequences at all.62 
                                                                                                                                                    
future generations, a policy of only allowing male children to be born through this method 
might be implemented: National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, op. 
cit. note 52, Ch 4, p6-7; A.L Bredenoord, et al. Avoiding transgenerational risks of 
mitochondrial DNA disorders: a morally acceptable reason for sex selection? Hum Reprod 
2010; 25: 1354-1360; J.B. Appleby. The ethical challenges of the clinical introduction of 
mitochondrial replacement techniques. Med Health Care Philos 2015; 18: 501-514. This 
would have the effect of a policy initiative changing the way in which we might classify 
MTTs by simply blocking the possibility of inheritable changes for future generations. 
61 Personal communication, Professor David Thorburn. 
62 This could occur, for example, if a female relative (or any other oocyte donor who had 




Fifth, the risk of the change may also be relevant. In approaches that use 
recombinant DNA methodology to target the nucleus, it could be argued 
that the risk is higher due to possibilities such as a change occurring in the 
wrong gene.63 Debates continue about the safety of techniques such as 
MST and PNT.64 Nevertheless, regulations permitting their use in highly 
regulated environments have been introduced in the United Kingdom; and 
other jurisdictions may soon follow. 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
mitochondria: Smeets, op. cit. note 59. The result would be to enrich a mitochondrial 
genotype that is already present in the intending mother’s germ-line, rather than the 
resulting individual receiving any ‘new’ sequence. However, heteroplasmy is necessary for 
this because if the intending mother was homoplasmic for the relevant mutation, then she 
would only have mutated mitochondria to enrich. Smeets uses this scenario to claim that 
not all MTTs will change the germ-line; a point we return to in Part V below. 
63 e.g. An ‘off-target’ effect is one such concern: H. O'Geen, et al. How specific is 
CRISPR/Cas9 really? Curr Opin Chem Biol 2015; 29: 72-78. 
64 Morrow, et al., op. cit. note 51; Reinhardt, et al, op. cit. note 51; G. Hamilton. The 
mitochondria mystery. Nature 2015; 525: 444-446; A.L. Bredenoord & P. Braude. Ethics of 
mitochondrial gene replacement: from bench to bedside. BMJ 2010; 341: c6021; c.f. 
NESCI, op. cit. note 49; P.F. Chinnery, et al. The challenges of mitochondrial replacement. 
PLoS Genet 2014; 10: e1004315; H. Ma, et al. Metabolic rescue in pluripotent cells from 
patients with mtDNA disease. Nature 2015; 524: 234-238; L.A. Hyslop, et al. Towards 
clinical application of pronuclear transfer to prevent mitochondrial DNA disease. Nature 
2016; 534: 383-6; and M. Yamada, et al. Genetic drift can compromise mitochondrial 
replacement by nuclear transfer in human oocytes Cell Stem Cell 2016; 18: 1-6.  
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Finally, the intentionality of the change may be different; although this is a 
contentious variable. It might be claimed that with more ‘traditional’ forms 
of germ-line gene therapy there is an intention to effect change for future 
generations.65 In contrast, MTTs might instead aim at preventing the 
somatic cell deficiency in the oocyte or embryo, with any change to future 
generations being an unintentional ‘by-product’. However, this distinction 
is disingenuous in that the inheritability of MTTs is widely understood. 
 




Target Nuclear DNA Mitochondria (MT) 





Kind and degree of 
change 
Alteration; Variable Replacement; Small or 
Nil 
Asserted Risk Higher Lower 
Intentionality Intentional effect for 
future generations 
‘Unintended by-
product’ of attempt to 
prevent embryo’s 
somatic cell deficiency? 
                                                          
65 Juengst & Parens, op. cit. note 7, raise (but do not endorse) this point when considering 
the differences between somatic and germ-line gene therapy: see pages 22-3. We have 





Applying the variables of classification to MTTs 
Our discussion illustrates that there are ongoing tensions in classifying 
interventions in the human genome. We will now consider how MTTs 
might be classified in light of this.  
 
At first glance, only MTTs that aim to treat the non-germ cells of existing 
individuals with mitochondrial disease would satisfy the definition of 
somatic gene therapy. As there is no such therapy at present, it appears 
that MTTs are unlikely to be classified as somatic therapies. Yet two 
counter-points can be considered before somatic MTTs are dismissed 
completely. 
 
First, if we were to adopt the earlier, as opposed to later, definitions of GLT 
(those that encompass gametes rather than embryos) then approaches 
such as PNT could be said to fall outside GLTs scope. PNT may therefore 
instead be ‘somatic’ because it is applied at an early stage of embryonic 
development. However, later GLT definitions that do include pre-embryos 
and embryos would run counter to this.  
 
A second reason, as mentioned earlier, is that the inheritance of 
mitochondria is matrilineal. Only females born of an altered oocyte or 
embryo will pass their substituted mitochondria on to their children; and of 
31 
 
that second generation, again only females will pass them on. As such, if a 
male child is born with an altered mitochondrial genome, then no further 
generations are likely to inherit this change. Depending on the biological 
sex and reproductive outcomes of those born of this technology, replaced 
mitochondria may or may not be passed on. MTT that gives rise to male 
offspring may instead be a type of gene therapy that sits between somatic 
and germ-line. A change is made that affects every cell of the recipient, but 
will be very unlikely to be passed on to that individual’s children. 
 
It therefore appears that MTT does not easily fit a definition of somatic 
gene therapy, or would at least be a distinct form of somatic therapy. 
Therefore, we shall focus on whether MTTs are a form of GLT, as many 
have suggested or assumed.66 
 
                                                          
66 e.g. Nuffield Council on Bioethics, op. cit. note 26; Rubenstein et al. op. cit. note 14; 
National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine, op. cit. note 52, Chapter 3, p. 
8 (though note that they restrict their categorisation to female recipients only); F. Baylis. 
The ethics of creating children with three genetic parents. Reprod Biomed Online 2013; 26: 
531-534; M. Darnovsky. A slippery slope to human germline modification. Nature 2013; 
499: 127; Thorburn, et al., op. cit. note 22 (regarding ooplasmic transplantation; they 
claim it is germline modification but not gene therapy); Reddy, et al., op. cit. note 16; 
Tachibana, et al., op. cit. note 28; D.S. Kyriakouli, et al. Progress and prospects: gene 
therapy for mitochondrial DNA disease. Gene Ther 2008; 15: 1017-1023; Adams, op. cit. 
note 6; and E.Y. Adashi and I.G. Cohen. Going germline: mitochondrial replacement as a 
guide to genome editing. Cell 2016; 164: 832-835. 
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Given that the target in most MTTs is extra-nuclear, they will not be GLT if 
we take GLT to be synonymous with changes to nuclear DNA only. But if we 
accept that the target for change is beside the point and adopt a broad 
definition of GLT/IGM that encompasses any change to the genome of a 
germ cell, then MTTs may begin to look more like a germ-line intervention. 
Applying pertinent elements of IGM and HGLGM, MTTs are, prima facie at 
least: a form of modification; that acts on the genome; which are 
biomedically focused; are aimed at restoring (or perhaps enhancing) 
function and are undertaken intentionally. 
 
However, as we will discuss further in Part V, at the very least this suggests 
that classifying MTTs does not appear to straightforwardly fall within 
existing (albeit contested) classifications. MTTs depart from predominant 
conceptions of IGM/HGLGM in two important ways: they are inherited only 
conditionally and may not always lead to a novel genome.  
 
This leads us to the third option of our classificatory approach, which 
involves questioning whether the properties of MTTs should matter 
ethically, to use these concerns to guide classification. This means that 
rather than focus on the nature or type of an intervention, we look at its 
purpose and possible effects or consider their moral concern.67 
 
                                                          
67 J.A. Robertson. Oocyte cytoplasm transfers and the ethics of germ-line intervention. J 
Law Med Ethics. 1998; 26: 179, 211-220. 
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IV. ETHICAL CONCERNS AND CLASSIFICATION 
Interplay between classificatory status and ethical concern is a hallmark of 
debates over genome modification. Early demarcations between germ-line 
and somatic interventions focused on potential risk implications for future 
generations that might arise from altering the germ-line.68 Subsequently, 
this has meant that any technological intervention classed as a 
GLT/IGM/HGLGT in humans has generally been deemed to be ethically 
problematic and, as such, prohibited.69 By re-considering the classificatory 
status of MTTs in terms of the ethically relevant concerns arising, any 
association between MTTs and the inheritable interventions discussed 
above invites an exploration of the grounds for justifying such 
interventions, rather than simply accepting that they should be prohibited. 
However, we need to consider what ethically relevant issues for 
classification arise from MTTs before any such association can be made. 
Even if these do mirror those of traditional GLTs, we may still ask whether 
they generate the same intractable problems in this context.  
 
                                                          
68 F. Baylis & J.S. Robert. 2006. Radical rupture: exploring biological sequelae of volitional 
inheritable genetic modification. In The Ethics of Inheritable Genetic Modification: A 
Dividing Line? J.E.J. Rasko, et al., eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 131-148: 
131; and The President's Council on Bioethics. 2003. Beyond Therapy: Biotechnology and 
the Pursuit of Happiness. United States: Executive Office of the President. Available at: 
https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/handle/10822/559341 [Accessed 6 Jan 2016]. 
69 European Medical Research Councils, op. cit. note 2; UNESCO, op. cit. note 2; Council of 
Europe, op. cit. note 2. 
34 
 
Ethically relevant issues for classificatory concerns for MTTs cluster around 
several topic areas:70 
(1) whether an intervention would provide treatment for some 
sort of identifiable medical condition, or whether it would 
constitute some other form of medical intervention;  
(2) whether the intervention would be identity-affecting; and  
(3) concerns about future generations;  
 
MTTs and the treatment-enhancement distinction 
Some early publications discussing gene therapy used the goal of the 
intervention – whether to cure or to enhance – as an indication of the 
permissibility of the approach.71 Although the primary question so far has 
focused on the kind of intervention MTTs might be, concern has also been 
raised as to the possibility of it potentially being used for (currently 
impermissible) enhancement purposes.72 From the perspective of 
classification, this would mean that MTTs might fall outside the scope of 
gene therapy on the grounds that they may not be a therapy, but an 
enhancement.  
                                                          
70 This is not to say that MTTs don’t give rise to broad concerns of safety, harm, and risk, 
only that the major classificatory concerns arise predominantly around these areas. For a 
wider range of ethical concerns associated with MTTs, e.g. Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 
op. cit. note 26; Bredenoord & Braude, op. cit. note 64; and Baylis, op. cit. note 66. 
71 e.g. Anderson, op. cit. note 3434. 
72 Baylis, op. cit. note 66. The definitions of gene therapy in Part III also refer to correcting 




Such uses of interventions designed with the intention of being used as 
treatments, but which could also be used to enhance, is a long-standing 
problem; not least because the distinction between treatment and 
enhancement is a difficult one to make.73 This difficulty is partly caused by 
a lack of conceptual clarity as to when an intervention is a treatment or an 
enhancement – they exist on a continuum.74  Additionally, using this 
distinction to determine permissible and impermissible uses of a 
technology begs the question as to whether a clear conceptual distinction 
can be drawn in the first place.  
 
Although a clear distinction between what constitutes a treatment or an 
enhancement may be difficult to establish, there will still be relatively 
clear-cut cases. If uses of MTT can clearly be shown to be treatment then, 
even if enhancement uses are possible in the future, it would strongly 
                                                          
73 e.g. A. Buchanan. 2011. Beyond Humanity? The Ethics of Biomedical Enhancement. 
Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press; J. Savulescu, et al. eds. 2011. Enhancing 
Human Capacities. New York: Wiley-Blackwell; F.M. Kamm. Is there a problem with 
enhancement? Am J Bioeth 2005; 5: 5-14; and P.H. Schwartz. Defending the distinction 
between treatment and enhancement. American Journal of Bioethics 2005; 5: 17-19. 
74 Difficulties over accurately drawing the therapy/enhancement distinction have been 
used by Resnik & Langer, op. cit. note 29, as an argument for the inadequacy of the use of 
the term ‘human germline gene therapy’ (emphasis added) on the grounds that it cannot 
capture all such distinctions surrounding procedures intended to alter the human germ-
line genome.  
36 
 
indicate that MTTs should be classed as therapies. The reason this 
distinction need only satisfy central cases of MTTs being classed as 
‘treatments’ is that many biotechnological interventions that would have 
an application as enhancements will have been developed as having some 
sort of therapeutic purpose.75 Accordingly, the technology would have 
been developed and used based on those therapeutic benefits, rather than 
a need to justify it as an enhancement. Hence, while there might be 
benefits to mitochondrial replacement that could be achieved for those 
without an identifiable mitochondrial disorder,76 there remain clear-cut 
therapeutic applications of MTT. It is these that should form the core for 
classification. 
 
However, this places a large part of the classificatory burden onto whether 
MTT actually achieves the intended goal of being a therapeutic treatment. 
Addressing whether MTTs can be considered as therapies at all raises a 
new classificatory concern that is not based on the distinction between 
treatment and enhancement but rather a consideration of who the subject 
of the MTT intervention is and whether they can be said to be receiving a 
                                                          
75 That biomedical interventions have both therapeutic and enhancement uses is widely 
recognized and has led to concern over how to demarcate the two. See, for example: M.J. 
Mehlman. How Will We Regulate Genetic Enhancement? Wake Forest L Rev 1999; 34: 
671– 617.; Buchanan, op. cit. note 73; The President's Council on Bioethics, op. cit. note 
68; and Kamm, op. cit. note 73. 
76 For example: augmentation of energy production, or reducing the likelihood of obesity 
or risk of diabetes. 
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treatment. Such a consideration involves issues of identity and how the 
method of MTT used can lead to a distinction between treatment and 
reproductive selective choice.77  
 
Identity Concerns in MTTs 
Issues of identity underpin concern as to whether or not there is an 
identifiable individual who can be said to receive MTT. This, in turn, may be 
pivotal as to whether MTTs can be classified as a treatment (therapy) at all. 
The concern arises because of the individually oriented way that gene 
therapy is defined.78 If such definitions are sound, then anything that does 
not treat a specific individual may not be classifiable as gene therapy. 
 
Questions of identity inevitably rely upon metaphysical theory. Engaging 
with contentious views as to the nature and origins of persons may not 
seem an appealing or relevant basis in which to ground MTT ethics and 
policy, particularly given there may be substantial implications as to the 
treatment or welfare of future individuals, or where disagreement over 
metaphysical positions might be deemed too abstract to shape matters of 
                                                          
77 Reproductive selective choice concerns prospective parents choosing reproductive 
methods that may lead to the creation of different possible future children. Parents can 
choose the child whom they consider will have the best quality of life.  See S. Wilkinson. 
2010. Choosing Tomorrow’s Children. Oxford: Oxford University Press.; and A. Wrigley, et 
al. Mitochondrial Replacement: Ethics and Identity. Bioethics 2015; 29: 631-638. 
78 See Part III above. 
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such practical importance to people’s lives.79 However, questions like this 
have played a major role in debates surrounding harms and benefits for 
future generations. Moreover, some issues - particularly those surrounding 
the margins of life - will inevitably give rise to concerns that are 
metaphysical in nature.80  
 
One of the most compelling and widely cited accounts of identity is given 
by Parfit.81 Not only can Parfit’s arguments be used to raise questions 
about whether an individual can be harmed or benefit by choices 
concerning their originating genetic constitution – which can include MTTs 
– it can also be used to raise an interesting classificatory concern based on 
whether or not there is an identifiable individual who can be said to be the 
                                                          
79 e.g. Lewens, op. cit. note 5. Lewens raises concerns as to the emphasis placed on 
identity and origin. 
80 e.g. D. Parfit. 1984. Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press; J. Feinberg. 
Wrongful life and the counterfactual element in harming. Soc Philos Policy 1987; 4: 145-
178; M. Hanser. Harming future people. Philos Public Aff 1990; 19: 47-70; D. Velleman. 
Persons in prospect. Philos Public Aff 2008; 36: 221-288; A. Wrigley. Genetic selection and 
modal harms. Monist 2006; 89: 505-525; A. Wrigley. Harm to future persons: non-identity 
problems and counterpart solutions. Ethical Theory Moral Pract 2012; 15 175-190; and 
Wrigley et al., op. cit. note 77. 
81 Parfit, Ibid. 
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subject of the MTT. Parfit provides an account of identity in terms of our 
originating gametes.82 According to this ‘Origins View’:  
…each person has this distinctive necessary property: that of having 
grown from the particular pair of cells from which this person in 
fact grew.83 
 
This means that anyone’s existence is dependent upon a particular egg 
being fertilized by a particular sperm. If a different sperm or egg had been 
involved, then a numerically different person would have existed instead. 
This underpins the Non-Identity Problem; that a person cannot have been 
made worse (or better) off than they otherwise would have been through 
pre-conception actions that alter the fertilizing gametes involved because 
they would not have existed at all if those pre-conception actions had been 
                                                          
82 This is an account of our numerical identity – whether we have the same or different 
object – and is distinguished from other senses of identity, such as qualitative, personal, or 
social identity. 
83 Parfit, op. cit. note 80, p. 352. This ‘Origins View’ position is derived from S. Kripke. 
1980. Naming and Necessity. Oxford: Blackwell. Parfit in fact held a somewhat weaker 
version of this, called the ‘Time Dependence Claim’, which has the slightly more pragmatic 
claim to conception within a certain time-limit. This is a less contentious position but one 
that would pose problems in its application to reproductive technologies, where gametes 
can be stored for years, as opposed to natural conception.  The Origins View, although 
widely used in discussions of genetics and reproductive technologies, is not without critics. 
See: D. Lewis. 1986. On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Blackwell and P. Mackie. 2006. 




any different. Such changes to the originating sperm or egg involved in 
conception would have resulted in an entirely different person existing 
instead. 
 
The question as to whether MTTs affect identity in a way that is subject to 
the Non-Identity Problem is dependent upon the particular MTT. In MST, 
the intervention is carried out prior to fertilization; when no individual 
could yet be said to be determined. In PNT, the pronuclei transfer is 
performed after fertilization; when numerical identity has already been 
established. This would indicate that the Non-Identity Problem could apply 
to MST, if, for example, a different sperm fertilised the egg than if the 
maternal gamete had not undergone manipulation.84 There may also be 
further concerns as to whether the changing of the mitochondrial genome 
can alter the genetic identity of the oocyte to the point where it is 
considered a different egg than if MST had not taken place.85 Accordingly, 
                                                          
84 It should be noted that this is not an absolute necessity – the same sperm that would 
have fertilised the egg if MST had not taken place could, conceivably, have done so with 
the MST process. This is extremely unlikely as a random possibility, but may be more likely 
if sperm were pre-selected for fertilization and would be used regardless of whether the 
MST process was employed. This means that the Non-Identity Problem may not apply in 
all possible cases of MST, but if mitochondria do alter genetic identity then it will apply 
regardless of whether the same or a different sperm is used to fertilise the modified 
oocyte.  
85 The issue of whether altering the mtDNA of an oocyte in this way is sufficient to mean 
that an entirely different egg has been created than would otherwise have been used in 
41 
 
such a method could not harm the resulting child (unless they are deemed 
to have a life not worth living) because a numerically different individual 
would have been born if MST had not been used. 
 
If MST could not be said to harm the resulting child, it also could not 
benefit them. Given existing claims that gene therapies must benefit 
individuals, MST would therefore not be a therapy.86 The determination of 
genetic status has been made prior to the conception of the resulting child. 
Any other choice or selection would have resulted in different gametes 
being used87 and hence a different child being conceived.88 There is, 
therefore, no individual patient who has had their genetic defects 
                                                                                                                                                    
conception is beyond the scope of this paper. The role of mtDNA in this regard is unclear. 
However, the concern that such radical manipulation of an egg may result in its 
destruction and replacement by a new egg may have some support based on an 
essentialist ‘organism view’, as implied by Liao: S.M. Liao. The organism view defended. 
Monist 2006; 89: 334-350. If this were the case, then it may also have further implications 
as to whether a similar argument can be made for the zygote in the case of PNT. 
86 As implied by Frankel & Hagen, op. cit. note 32, p. 8-9; and Nuffield Council on 
Bioethics, op. cit. note 26, p. 57. 
87 For example, an oocyte that had not undergone MST; or a donor oocyte. 
88 In making this point, we are assuming that mitochondria are relevant to numeric 
identity. However, this point is not settled; as discussed above.  
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‘treated’.89 There is simply a person born who is very unlikely to have (or 
develop) a mitochondrial condition. 
 
As PNT occurs after fertilization, this would alter the genome of an already 
existing individual.90 The Non-Identity Problem would not arise, as it would 
be possible to consider that particular child’s welfare had they not had 
PNT. It also means that PNT could potentially be classifiable as a beneficial 
treatment to an identifiable individual who would otherwise have had a 
debilitating mitochondrial disease. This form of MTT could therefore be 
defined as a gene therapy. 
 
                                                          
89 It is possible by definition to widen the scope of therapeutic target such that, for 
example, one may claim that the individual being treated is the mother using the 
technique to ‘treat’ her condition of ‘being unable to have children who would not pass on 
mitochondrial disease to their future children’, such as has been suggested by as Frankel & 
Hagen, op. cit. note 32.  However, there would have to be some reasonable consensus 
agreement in medicine that such expanded definitions really were instances of a 
recognisable condition before such a move could be considered as potentially influencing 
the classification of MTTs. 
90 Although outside the scope of this paper, the previously mentioned possibility in note 




As only PNT is readily classifiable as a gene therapy, we are left with the 
question of how to classify MST. 91 One consideration is that MST might be 
considered as a ‘reproductive technology’ rather than a gene therapy, as 
currently understood, and therefore might be better classified as offering 
reproductive selective choice rather than treatment. Or, MST may fit within 
the description of IGM or HGLGM. Regardless, MST would allow a woman 
or couple to exercise a certain aspect of choice over their future - but not 
yet existent - children; namely the choice to have a child who is both 
genetically related to its mother and unlikely to have or develop a 
mitochondrial condition. 
 
This classificatory distinction may also have ethical implications for the use 
of MTTs depending upon attitudes towards the goals of medicine, such as 
whether treatment of individuals is more important than allowing parents 
to exercise reproductive selective choice.92 Yet we are nevertheless left in 
something of a strange position with MTTs, in that the way in which they 
are carried out can be relevant to their classificatory status as a treatment 
rather than such a classification simply being premised on a perceived goal 
                                                          
91 We use the term ‘readily classifiable’ here as we have recognised the potential for 
rejecting the Non-Identity Problem as well as the possibility of widening the scope of 
‘therapy’. However, both of these exceptions are sufficiently tenuous so as not to directly 
shape the classificatory argument.  
92 For further discussion of the identity issues raised and of their ethical implications, see: 
Wrigley et al., op. cit. note77. 
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of eliminating mitochondrial disease. What does emerge, however, is that 
whether a MTT is a therapy or an exercise of reproductive selective choice, 
they can all be considered as conditionally inheritable genomic 
modifications.93 
 
Ethics and the impact of MTTs on future generations 
As we have discussed, anything with the potential to lead to inheritable 
change gives rise to concerns about unforeseen consequences for future 
generations.94 Recognising the matrilineal inheritance of most MTTs, these 
possible consequences may be over-emphasised given that transmission 
will cease if a male child is born. The ‘conditional inheritability’ of MTTs 
mitigates concerns about the unbounded effects of altering a genome even 
though it does not entirely remove the possibility. While this is simply a 
reining-in of a statistical chance, this reduction in the likelihood of 
transmission means it is reasonable to question whether precautionary 
fears about harms to future generations should be given such weight in 
assessing the ethical implications of MTTs.95 
                                                          
93 We discuss this further in Part V below. 
94 K.R. Smith. Gene Therapy: Theoretical And Bioethical Concepts. Arch Med Res 2003; 34: 
247-268; and Chadwick, op. cit. note 17. 
95 One response to this is to require all children born using MTT to be male in order to 
prevent transmission, such as has been suggested elsewhere: National Academies of 
Sciences, Engineering and Medicine, op. cit. note 52; Appleby, op. cit. note 60; 
Bredenoord et al, op. cit. note 60. This position would largely eliminate concerns about 




V. CLASSIFYING MTTS AS CONDITIONALLY INHERITABLE GENOMIC 
MODIFICATION (CIGM) 
MTTs do not appear to fit directly into an established traditional (narrow) 
classificatory category of somatic or germ-line therapies. Utilizing broader 
classifications, such as IGM or HGLGM, also seems to fail to adequately 
provide a means of classifying MTTs; at least insofar as the fact that it 
groups MTTs with interventions that they depart from in several significant 
ways. Looking at key ethical issues that surround MTTs also raises 
problems for classification: the treatment/enhancement distinction is 
rebuttable; not all MTTs will target individuals; and concerns for future 
generations can be mitigated by their conditional inheritability. To consider 
an alternative classification would seem both reasonable and, at least 
partially, follow what Frankel and Hagen imply when they claim that: ‘there 
may still be ethical distinctions between types of germ-line modification.’96  
 
As narrow-scope (approach (a) in Section I) attempts at classification fail to 
adequately capture all the features of MTTs, and with broader scope (b) 
and ethics-driven (c) classifications also raising problems, we propose that 
MTTs should be classified using a novel account of genomic modification; 
                                                                                                                                                    
sex selection. This would also not necessarily change the classification for MTT as it would 
be an additional intervention. However, the full scope of such a policy decision and its 
implications is outside the scope of this paper.  
96 Frankel & Hagen, op. cit. note 32, p. 6. 
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one that recognises that MTTs have some (but not all) properties of 
classically defined somatic and germ-line therapies or modifications, but 
also that they demonstrate conditional characteristics of inheritability. 
They form a (non-exclusive) sub-category of inheritable modification, 
which we call ‘Conditionally Inheritable Genomic Modification’ (CIGM).  
 
CIGM as a sub-category of inheritable modification differs from the 
‘standard’ account of inheritable genetic modifications due to them being 
‘conditionally inheritable’, which recognises matrilineal inheritance, 
bottleneck effects and unpredictability in mitochondrial segregation.97 We 
have also adopted Resnik and Langer’s use of ‘germline’ rather than 
‘genetic’ modification to avoid problems of MTTs targeting organelles 
rather than genes. However CIGM departs from HGLGM in that MTTs will 
not always give rise to a novel genome.98 It is important to note that CIGM 
is a sub-category of genomic modification that will include MTTs (and their 
various features discussed in Part III), but that it also could encompass 
techniques other than MTTs because it is neutral with regard to the target 
                                                          
97 In the sense that MTTs do not rely on future generations having modified mitochondria, 
as they are only inheritable under limited conditions; discussed in Part III. Bredenoord et 
al. have made a similar claim regarding MTTs as a particular class of ‘germ-line genetic 
modification’: Bredenoord, et al., op. cit. 27; as have Frankel & Hagen, op. cit. note 32, p. 
6; Thorburn et al., op. cit. note 22; and the Nuffield Council on Bioethics, op. cit. note 26: 
58-9. However Bredenoord et al’s categorisation relies on the invasiveness of the 
intervention, whereas we draw on its conditional inheritability.  
98 As discussed in Part III above; specifically note 62 and the accompanying text. 
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of the modification. This would also allow MTTs to be classified as genomic 
modifications without the need for a therapeutic distinction being made – 
both MST and PNT could be classified as CIGM. Yet it also excludes those 
broader interventions that might be seen to change the human germline 
without altering the genome, such as PGD or gamete donation, thereby 
avoiding category inflation by excluding a range of widely recognised 
reproductive interventions.   
 
Yet while CIGM is non-exclusive to MTTs, it may not encompass all MTTs. 
For example, Smeets’ scenario involving donated oocytes with mtDNA 
matched to the intending mother may not strictly be a ‘modification’99 
unless we were to define modification as encompassing methods of 
directed evolution as well as intention to change genomic inheritability.100  
CIGM also differs from the classification reached by the US National 
Academy of Science and Engineering in Medicine; who claim that only 
MTTs leading to female offspring would constitute an IGM, not those that 
                                                          
99 As the genetic complement of the resulting child would match that in the mother. See 
also note 62. 
100 However, pre-implantation genetic diagnosis to avoid the birth of a child with a 
mitochondrial condition may then also be defined as a CIGM. This may mean that we need 
to treat PGD the same as some MTTs, or that the particular form of MTT that Smeets (op. 
cit., note 59) is referring to is different in kind from other MTTs. Such an analysis is beyond 
the scope of this paper. 
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give rise to males.101 The Academy appears to base its classification of the 
outcome of the intervention; whereas we have based our classification on 
the properties and inheritability of the intervention itself. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
We have developed a new classification to encompass MTTs, called 
‘conditionally inheritable genomic modifications’ (CIGM); a new sub-
category of genomic modification. CIGM fits between the narrow and 
broad approaches we described in Part I and accounts for the scientific and 
ethical distinctions MTTs give rise to. It is not a category solely for MTTs 
but it allows them to be classified in a manner that avoids many of the 
concerns that arise from attempting to classify them through previously 
established categories.  
 
There remain wider implications for adopting such a category, however. 
Although our classification of MTTs as CIGMs might indicate that their 
automatic prohibition as germ-line therapies is not warranted, it would not 
settle the question surrounding ethical concerns retained from other 
debates about genetic modification that don’t depend on classification. 102 
                                                          
101 National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, op. cit. note 52, Chapter 3, 
p. 8. 
102 We are here taking the “automatic prohibition” of germ-line interventions as being 
derived from existing international policy, which we interpret as indicating that germ-line 
modification should be prohibited. However, our point is that other ethical issues in MTTs 
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For example, we would still require sufficient knowledge of the effects of 
altering an oocyte’s mitochondria to make judgements about potential 
harms to future generations, and the standing question as to whether the 
therapeutic benefits outweigh potential harms would still need to be 
addressed. 
 
Moreover, in suggesting a change to the established categories of 
classification, we are aware that we might simply be encouraging an over-
expansion of classifications. In this case, however, we think it warranted. 
Although utilising a known or existing classification might have certain 
advantages due to its placement within a category with established ethical 
positions and regulatory instruments, this would seem to be ‘shoe-horning’ 
MTTs to a category they do not readily fit for the sake of taxonomic 
parsimony.  
 
Adopting CIGM will also have additional implications such as: ‘Does CIGM 
need specific regulations?’ and ‘Does it have ethical issues all of its own?’ 
But asking these questions will address concerns that we would be 
encouraging re-classification simply as a means of avoiding ethical scrutiny 
of MTTs. It might even go further by actually preventing ethical laxity 
through blocking the presumption that no new ethical issues arise from 
classifying something within an already established category. 
                                                                                                                                                    
will remain relevant regardless of its classification. See citations in note 2 for the most 
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